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THE HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ooOoo 
INTRODUCTION 
This Brief is based upon and very similar to the 
one filed by Stephen C. Ward, Assistant Attorney General, on 
behalf of the Utah Department of Transportation in regard to 
the cases wherein the Defendants are Walter M. Ogden, et al. 
and Rulon Lind and Flora S. Lind, his wife, et al. The purpose 
of this Brief is to relate the similar arguments to the cases 
wherein the Defendants are Laygo Company, et al. and J.D. 
Springer. These aforesaid four cases shall be referred to in 
this Brief as the "Ogden", "Lind", "Laygo" and "Springer" cases, 
respectively. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Under the exigent facts of these cases in eminent 
domain, should the lower Court have changed the dates of 
valuation from the statutory date of service of Summons in 
October, 1987 to June of 1977? 
2. Under the exigent facts of these cases, should the 
lower Court have changed when interest should commence to run 
from the dates the Order of Occupancy were granted in October, 
1987 to June of 1977? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider 
this matter as a result of the granting of a Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal on May 23, 1989. 
The Plaintiff-Appellant Utah Department of 
Transportation appeals from an order changing the statutory dates 
of valuation and when interest should run. The Plaintiff-
Appellant Utah Department of Transportation filed condemnation 
actions in 1987 to acquire portions of the Defendants-
Respondents' property to construct 1-70 west of Richfield City. 
The Sevier District Court also granted the Plaintiff-Appellant's 
Orders of Occupancy in the Laygo and Springer cases and did so 
shortly after the cases were filed. 
The dispute in this litigation involves the Sevier 
District Court changing the dates of valuation and when statutory 
interest should commence to run from October, 1987 to June, 1977. 
B. DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT. 
The Laygo, Springer, Ogden and Lind cases have not been 
consolidated for trial, but have only been consolidated for the 
purpose of determining the dates of valuation and when interest 
should commence to run. A nonjury trial was held before Judge 
Don V. Tibbs on March 9, 10, and 13, 1989 and orders fixing the 
dates of valuation and when interest should commence to run were 
entered April 10, 1987. (Laygo R-221-224, Springer R-215-218) 
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The Plaintiff-Appellant by this appeal seeks to have the 
foregoing orders reversed and to have the Utah Supreme Court 
order the dates of valuation and when interest should commence to 
run to be 1987. 
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. 
The Defendants-Respondents Laygo and Springer in these 
two cases each owned property which was needed for the 
construction of 1-70 in the area located west of Richfield, Utah. 
(Laygo R-l, Springer R-l) The Defendants-Respondents were served 
with Summons on the following dates: 
a. Laygo - October 15, 1987. (R-17-19) 
b. Springer - October 7, 1987. (R-19-21) 
The Plaintiff-Appellant tendered into Court its 
approved appraisals and secured uncontested Orders of Occupancy 
from the above-entitled Court on October 28/ 1987. (Laygo R-21-
27 and Springer R-23-28) 
The Defendants-Respondents withdrew the approved 
appraisal amounts which previously had been tendered into Court 
by the Plaintiff-Appellant without raising any issue with respect 
to either the Court's ordering different dates of valuation or 
the commencement of interest to run. (Laygo R-27, Springer R-28) 
On January 19, 1988, the Laygo Defendants-Respondents 
filed their Answer with the Court. On October 21, 1987, the 
Springer Defendants-Respondents filed their Answer with the 
above-entitled Court. (Laygo R-29-31, Springer R-l6-18) In 
neither of the Defendants-Respondents' Answers did they raise any 
issue with respect to this Court ordering different dates of 
valuation or the commencement of interest to run. 
Interrogatories were served on the Defendants-
Respondents by the Plaintiff-Appellant on January 12 (Springer) 
and 14 (Laygo) 1988, which to this date have remained unanswered. 
(Laygo R-32, Springer R-30) 
A pretrial was held on each of these cases before the 
above-entitled Court on the 6th day of July, 1988. (Laygo R-33-
34, Springer R-31) Plaintiff-Appellant's counsel was directed to 
prepare the Pretrial Order. Neither of these two Defendants-
Respondents raised any issue or concern during the pretrial 
hearing with respect to having this Court order different dates 
of valuation or the commencement of interest to run. (Laygo R-
173-176, Springer R-171-174) 
Copies of the proposed Pretrial Order were sent to 
Defendants-Respondent's counsel to approve as to form on July 15, 
1988. (Laygo R-173-176, Springer R-171-174) 
Defendants-Respondents' counsel neither approved the 
Pretrial Orders as to form nor submitted the Orders to the Court 
for execution. (Laygo R-173-176, Springer R-171-174) 
On July 18, 1988, the Plaintiff-Appellant submitted to 
the Defendants-Respondents a list of its potential witnesses and 
Exhibits. The Defendants-Respondents have failed to submit their 
lists of witnesses to the Plaintiff-Appellant. (Laygo R-37-38, 
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Springer R-35-36) 
In 1977, the Utah Department of Transportation approved 
the alignment of 1-70 to be west of Richfield, but did not 
receive its funding until December 20, 1985. (Laygo R-48, 
Springer R-46) In the meantime, between 1977 and 1985 when the 
project became funded, UDOT would have been making its final 
design in relation to each individual property owner involved. 
The properties involved would not have been ready to acquire 
until 1985. (Laygo R-91, Springer R-89) 
On March 18, 1977, UDOT completed its Environmental 
Impact Statement and on June 22, 1977, secured Federal Highway 
Administration approval. (Laygo R-91, Springer R-89) 
In the past UDOT may have argued against Richfield City 
approving any development in the proposed interstate corridors, 
but the final decision has always rested with Richfield City. 
(Laygo R-91, Springer R-89) There is no evidence in the record 
that Richfield City actually adopted any law or regulation that 
prohibited development in the proposed interstate corridor. 
It was the testimony of the Plaintiff-Appellant's MAI 
real estate appraiser that with respect to the Defendant-
Respondents Springer that this property was too costly to develop 
in 1977 as well as in 1987. (Tr. 407-411) Larger waterlines 
would be needed for subdivision of the Springer property and 
there is no sewer. (Tr. 409) Septic tank approval would not be 
allowed on the Springer property due to the presence of a nearby 
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spring. (Tr. 409-410) The cost of all utilities and the 
sewer/septic tank problems, led the State's expert appraiser to 
conclude that the highest and best use of the Springer property 
to be "horse belt" in both 1977 and 1987. (Tr. 410-411) 
The State's expert appraiser testimony by Mr. Lang, 
MAI, indicates that the Laygo property would be capable of being 
subdivided into the same number of lots (19) both in the "before 
interstate condition" and the "after interstate condition". This 
is because the lots that have property taken by the project are 
deeper than necessary under the City of Richfield's zoning 
requirements. (Tr. 413-415) 
Mr. Lang further testified that the lot prices would 
have been lower in 1977 than in 1987. (Tr. 420) 
Mr. Pete Monson, UDOT District Preconstruction 
Engineer, testified that the amount of Laygo property that could 
be taken by the relocation of the canal was limited by the 
location of a nearby City spring and pump house. (Tr. 432-433) 
Mr. Monson also testified that he had been approached 
by one of the Laygo property owners about five or six years ago 
to delineate an approximate location for the shifting of the 
canal (the take to occur) on the Laygo property, but that such 
request was withdrawn. (Tr. 435) 
Mr. Kay Mclff who was the Defendants-Respondents' 
attorney of record up until a few days before trial, was the only 
witness (other than parties) called by the Defendants-Respondents 
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during the trial. (Laygo 39-40, Springer 37-38) Mr* Mclff 
testified he had a direct pecuniary interest in the outcome of 
the case, and was not an independent witness. (Tr. 221) Mr. 
Mclff did not know the number of lots available for sale in the 
Richfield area in 1977. (Tr. 214) Mr. Mclff testified that he 
could not ascertain in 1977 that the Defendants-Respondents' 
properties were going to be impacted with the construction of 
1-70 because there was no final design of 1-70. (Tr. 218) 
Mr. Mclff made no explanation of the costs involved in 
the presentation of Defendant-Respondents case in chief to bring 
utilities to the Defendant-Respondents' properties. (Tr. 223 and 
Tr. 257 wherein Mr. Mclff indicates that his answer would be 
basically the same for the "Springer" parcel as he had answered 
for the northern "Lind" parcel since the Springer parcel is just 
north of the northern Lind parcel) 
Mi*. Mclff had not conducted a "vacant buildable lands 
inventory" nor studied the number of available homes for sale. 
(Tr. 259) 
Mir. Mclff indicated that the City of Richfield did "not 
per se" adopt any law restricting development within the corridor 
of the freeway. (Tr. 261) 
There is no evidence in the record that Springer or 
Laygo attempted to develop their properties, such as updated 
platting or seeking building permits. This would include the 
portion of the Laygo property that was separated by another road 
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from the proposed interstate had n^4- K^en subject to a bu Ilding 
j. _ ^ w w. updated platting. 
T h * - i i i i' in i " i i l n n i <-. mi ill I  I n in e n i >i ill I l i n t Inii y * v " ' :" 
Springer or anyone challenged the City's supposed policy •* 
denying development within the proposed interstate corridor 
W l i c i V i l i n j t i d u p t f . ' t l i 1-M.ju J i'J I i i i i l l S L i u : i i n - i l i i I d l i t mi I |" ".I 'ilin';" tH> ,!:•» .fr'-i, , 
Mr. Mclff acknowledged that the final design and 
funding for the construction * " i 01 che subject 
property n *^»- ^ oie lm-M . j 
SUMMAR1 01 : .ARGUMENT 
The time of valuation Is presumed In be 1 In iJain ul 
service of summons. UDOT v. Friberg, 687 P, 2d 82 1 i|lliah 19fM) 
p i o \ i :i d e c ! iiii i h a . e p l 11.iii I I I in in ' mi mi mi I  I rtHhinre " a I u n a h a u l s u l i * 11 n i l n i l I >, • 
changed over a period nt time and other circumstances warrant 
such a change in the date The Friberg < aso would not support 
such a change 1 .'alum in I In sill) JCM Jl aaseh h nice I. he 
circumstances arc-? not at all similar andf In any event, there has 
not been d 'abstantial rhanqo in values from the date of service 
of summons -he date lequest eiI by be I'ei idai i"l :s- Respc >ndei i I .s. 
•-he Defendants-Respondents were correct in asserting 
that then i»'1 I mI hostage" since 1977 by govern-
mental action, thei --«*•<.- of action accrued then which would 
now be barred by any applicable statute : limitations and the 
(TIIVHI iiiiipfil a I I iiiiiHiii i I y At I "T'liO" iH-'lenria - l e s p o n d e n t s d i d i 10 1: 
-o-
pursue such a claim in a timely manner, did not send notice under 
the Governmental Immunity Act, did not raise it in their answers 
to the subject complaints, did not raise it at the hearing on the 
subject motions for immediate occupancyf and did not raise it 
prior to withdrawing the funds deposited with the Court upon 
granting of the subject motions for immediate occupancy. To 
allow such a claim in the untimely manner that Defendants-
Respondents have done, places governments in an extremely 
difficult position in pursuing public projects. 
The subject properties were not "held hostage" by 
governmental action in 1977. The landowners did not pursue 
development of the property, even to the extent that would have 
been compatible with the proposed interstate. 
In any event, UDOT would have been prevented from 
instituting eminent domain proceedings in 1977 because funding 
for the project was not available until December, 1985. Salt 
Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d 182 (Utah 1977). The State of 
Utah should not be subject to an earlier valuation date than the 
service of summons when the Supreme Court of Utah determines that 
such earlier date is premature for the exercise of eminent domain 
due to lack of funding. 
In 1981, the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-34-19 which discourages government from premature 
condemnations. It would also subject the State of Utah to stiff 
penalties if condemnation actions had been filed in 1977, as it 
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would have been, very premature, as funding was 
The Defendants-Respondents should only be entitled • > 
interest 1 i/uin I,In- iluh I I.lit' |i|il I M M I immediate occupancy 
order since UDOT did not possess or occupy the properties before 
that time. Additionally, the immediate occupancy orders nafct-
reference to anv
 : 
announcement of a project (which occurred here 
award interest from since the 
property owner a windfall as they 
compensation for any improvements they made * property — 
summons. 
• * . Defendants-Respondents shiiuJ d in • I I 
allowed to pursue an alternate valuation date or interest date 
whei -# * Lne District 
Cour* The alternate -:m.K *. ^  clearl> - effuse to a condemnat i 01 :i 
act3 r *-ha* different fvw i st r^i^-'nic additional 
compensation. Requesting r 
substantially different in prosecuting -iefending an eminent 
dom< merely alleging that * - defendant should be 
entitled to greater compensa! I u\ <J i 
fact, requesting an alternate date is the functional equivalent 
oil i condemnation, which is certainly 
different from merely requesting greater compelihin i i u mlt-i n 
answer . complaint. 
Tin 11.1 i s ! t j i i i ' i r I I h»iU I v iprred in al lowing testimony 
relative to the highest and best use that was based upon 
speculative assemblage of certain of the properties. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-4 (1987) CREATES A 
PRESUMPTION THAT IN AN EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION, 
THE TIME OF VALUATION IS THE DATE OF THE SERVICE 
OF SUMMONS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987) fixes the date of the 
service of summons for the purpose of determining just 
compensation: 
For the purpose of assessing compensation 
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed 
to have accrued at the date of the service of 
summons
 f and its actual value at that date shall 
be the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to 
property not actually taken, but injuriously 
affected, in all cases where such damages are 
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section 
[§ 78-34-10]. No improvements put upon the 
property subsequent to the date of service of 
summons shall be included in the assessment of 
compensation or damages. [Emphasis added] 
[Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987)] 
The Defendants-Respondents cite the case of UDOT v. 
Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), as authority for changing the 
date of valuation in an eminent domain case. A close reading of 
the facts in the Friberg case will easily distinguish it from the 
Defendants-Respondents case. 
In the Friberg case, UDOT actually filed an action in 
eminent domain in 1972 to acquire a portion of the Defendants' 
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property. Shortly thereafter, at the hearing on t;^ motion . 
•-' of Immediate Occupancy, the Defendant landowners 
d e c l i n e d t o withdraw I ev i OIIH ,h| ' 
had been deposited into Court. 
, !-<v-ys dibu xcrserved * l <- issue - • Laintiff's 
right to acquire the property 
compensation was delayed for ^ ^ ^v y*~- ° because of * - federal 
ear period of time, Salt Lake City 
land values substantially increased. 
The Supreme Cour: v he Friberg case, because *" the 
dele : uie te. * + 4 ~ rid 
values : . ake i:i.y HO.I substantially increases j I In 
date • valuation to 1979. The Comr - doing -~ ^dded the 
follow "a caution: ,l" on e ,s of the 
service of summons date will r-r the rule, and departure from that 
seption uu / 
Justice Oaks - *« concur. 
Fribergs did not abandon their right tr) litigate the question of 
t l n i f 1 f t f j f -I I nii••ml in 11 Ihpnaupp they did nnt withdraw t h e $80,000 
that had previously been deposited p U r s u a n t 
Immediate Occupancy. Justice Oaks concluded that the date of 
valuatxuii w";,j ) \ '.lender wi «";i t !'M,J state's right to condemn was 
decided by the Court, The State's right to condemn was 
established until December, 1979. 
Utal i Code A. i i i'11 ,1 • I " I n," I "' <' 11 / I I a I t • n I, I • e, f f» 1 I o w i n g : 
The rights of the just compensation for the 
land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be 
ascertained and awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 
and established by judgment therein, and the said 
judgment shall include, as part of the just compen-
sation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
on the amount finally awarded as the value of the 
property and damages, from the date of taking 
actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or order 
of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of 
judgment; but interest shall not be allowed on so 
much thereof as shall have been paid into court. 
Upon the application of the parties in interest, 
the court shall order the money deposited in the 
court be paid forthwith for or on account of the 
just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. 
A payment to a defendant as aforesaid shall be held 
to be an abandonment by such defendant of all 
defenses excepting his claim for greater compensa-
tion. [Emphasis added] 
The Friberg case expressly disallows the Defendant 
landowners a different valuation date if the order of occupancy 
is granted and the landowners withdraw the approved appraisal 
from the Court. 
The Defendants-Respondents on Page 18 of their 
Memorandum state the following: 
"If the (Richfield) market would have continued to 
improve (from 1977). Defendants would have been 
uninjured." (Laygo R-60, Springer R-58) 
These Defendants-Respondents seem to be proposing that 
anytime between the announcement of a corridor for a proposed 
road occurs and when the service of summons happens the landowner 
can choose their date of valuation when real estate values are 
the highest. How anxious would the Defendant-Respondent 
landowners be willing to change the date of valuation from 
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1986 to 1977 If real estate values had continued to increase? 
The Defendants-Respondents • v brief refer to lhe 
~*~~ ~« UDOT v. Partington, Civi 1 g>as i; eciMI 1 I! \ 
tried ** District Court v: Sevier County is interesting 
is i *fendant I an iowners 
testifiea i .-nee per air ^. Kay Mclff was the 
attorney ^ record. The Partington property is located in close 
I 
Page 83 of the Transcript of the testimony of Mr. ^~u~ 
Brown, the appraiser hired by the Partingtons, states as follows: 
Partingtoi I i, aJ i la t: i c i i da te w as ] 98 7 
Sale No. February, 1980 5.1 acres. 
Sale price: $67,830.00 - $13,300 per acne=J 
50 percent adjustment for location 
10 percent for size 
Total add on adjustment per acre was 
Per acre value was $17,955.00 
Seller Wallace Sorenson 
Buyer Hal Ward 
Located at 300 East in Richfield, Utah. 
Sa1«.' If Illlni. 7 
Located off 5th East and 8th North Richfield City -
15.28 acres 
Sorenson Estates was the Seller 
Brush Wellman was the Buyer 
Sale price: $121,467.00 
Price per acre $7,947.00 
Adjusted price $16,690.00 
No sales date listed 
Sale No. I 
Location at 11th West and 520 South Richfield City 
Sale date 198? 
Seller Da r^ *" 
Buyer Craig Anderson 
Sale price $52,500.00 
Per acre value $10,500.00 
30 percent plus adjustment 
Net adjustment of $7,350.00 
Adjusted value of subject $17,850.00 
Sale No. 4: 
Sale date January 1983 
Seller Richfield Land 
Buyer Khoesrow 
9.36 acres in located North of Richfield City 
Golf Course 
Total sale price $11,431.00 
Total adjustments $7,143.00 
Adjusted value of subject property $18,574.00 
Sale No. 5: 
Seller Labrum Investment 
Buyer Gordon - Sale date August, 1988 
North of Richfield City Golf Course 
1.07 acres 
$30,000.00 sale price 
Per acre value of $28,037.00 
50 percent adjustment for size 
Adjusted price of subject property 
$19,627,00 (Laygo R-76, 98-99, Springer R-74, 
96-97) 
Mr. Brown made no adjustments for time on any of 
his sales. The sales ranged from February, 1980 to August, 
1988. 
The Partington property is located west of Richfield 
City and in close proximity to the Laygo and Springer properties. 
The Partington case used the service of summons date of valuation 
of 1987. In Paragraph 26 on Page 11 of the Defendant's memo, the 
Defendants use a figure of $13,500 as the value of what the Laygo 
and Springer property should be. (Laygo R. 53, Springer R. 51) 
It is interesting that with a 1987 valuation date, the appraiser 
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in the Partington case used a figure of $17,500 as the value of 
the property taken, 
POINT " 
THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT UDOT ACTED IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH EMINENT DOMAIN LAW IN THE ACQUISITION OF THE 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' PROPERTY. 
Any reference In the Defendants-Respondents' Memorandum 
c iiil Court relatincr i *he announcement of 
and/or proposed completion dates ^ nnon newspaper > 
which * otuv cf the rankest forms of hearsay evidence that 
exJ ! ) I'll* foregoinq is 
merely the opinion ewspaper .: :egard to when the 
completion date i - 0 might be. City of Cheyenne v. Frangosf 
4 : 
The Defendants argue on Page 22 of their brief the 
following (Laygo p M cpringer R-62): 
Defendants do not claim the creation of a 
cause of action against either Federal or State 
authorities ?,o: do they impugn their integrity. 
Thp^* "v\ - •- "t-spondents argue they should be 
allowed .oose then aac.: valuatioi as any ..ate betweei i tl le 
time of the announcement of corridor and when the 
£ place ':l roregoing reasoning 
is flawed and without legal precedence. -, landowners ui tlii, ,*r 
case choose 197? because at first glance this appears to be the 
1 i • hI i ii" Id (' i I y r\ r a n ! r d 1 b u x 1 tiiJiq 
permits. (Laygo R-49, Springer R-47) 
The problem being there is no cause and effect 
relationship between 1977, the year that Richfield City granted 
the highest number of building permits and the proposed 
announcement of the 1-70 corridor. (Tr. 210) There is evidence 
that as early as 1970, that UDOT preliminary approved the present 
corridor. The Defendants-Respondents have made no correlation 
between the demand for building permits in 1977 and how many 
building lots were offered for sale. (Tr. 214) 
The real problem with the foregoing reasoning of the 
Defendants-Respondents lies arguendo in the fact that if their 
property was taken or damaged in 1977, they were then obligated 
to pursue their legal remedies as outlined in the case of Walton 
v. UD0Ty 558 P.2d 609 (Utah 1976). In the Walton case, UDOT 
regarded a public street in the Summit Park subdivision to create 
a better street for cars to travel on during the temporary 
construction of 1-80. The landowners felt by UDOT altering this 
access their property had been taken and/or damaged. The 
landowners instituted an action against UDOT to recover damages 
resulting from the alleged alteration of their access. The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled the Plaintiff had an action in law and is 
thus governed by the Governmental Immunity Act and the limitation 
of actions. 
The Defendants-Respondents have obviously failed to 
comply with any applicable statute of limitations and must be 
precluded from raising such a claim beyond such limitation 
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period Foi instance, Utah Code J Ann, § 76-12-36(1) (1987) 
IPP .1 il i Hf« yp.Li - t nit mi'r« ai limitations for "trespass upon 
.- injury to j r-M I property" and Utah Code Ann 
(1987) provides for a four year statute of limitations where one 
i? i se pi: o < i :i • ied 1:: ] ] a ; ; 
If, as the Defendants-Respondents *~ case at bar 
allege, tha * a king and/or damaging of their property occurred 
I Walton 
with the waiver of Immunity Act Utah Code Ann § 63-30* 
(1953), bars a claim under the Governmental Immunity Act unless 
w r i t t e n n o t i c e ; J i l n l v • i l h I In Ulah At 1 ui ney CeiietdJ1 rjjn.l llii" 
agency concerned within one year after the cause of action 
""Il""lr Nruiitifh. in i I Inp Walton ease and the Defendants-
Respondents ,i in the cast,' at bar failed to allege the foregoing. 
The Defendants i i i the case at bar are now precluded from alleging 
1 1 I 1 1 K i l i y I in mi i Il »I in II! i in 1 1 1 in mi i Il  I III! in mi mi 1 1 in 1 1 [ H* ' i I "i, I 11 in I mi mi in 11 j,,* I in 1 1 "I i» i »r cur red 
in 19 7 7 . • 
As set forth in the Statement r Facts, the funding - - * 
t i l I !"'« f J d l t 1 T ii I I i | I \\ ' i. I ' ' I 1 W i 1 
1985 , ( T r . 246 , 24 9) 
The foregoing raises a problem which was dealt with in 
the case oi bait Lake Comity v. Ramosella 
1977), Surprisingly enough, the Ramoselli case was decided the 
same year ri*i I ho current Defendants-Respondents want as their 
date of valuation. In the Ramoselli case the IJ" I airrlli i t Mall I.fike 
County was precluded from condemning the Defendant's property 
because there were no funds in existence in Salt Lake County to 
develop the property to the use specified in the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. The Supreme Court felt because said funding was not 
present, that Salt Lake County failed in its burden of proving 
need or public necessity and that the attempted condemnation was 
a clear abuse of discretion. Under the facts of the Ramoselli 
case, the Plaintiff-Appellant in the cases at bar would have been 
precluded from condemning the Defendants-Respondents' property 
before they had the funding in place to commence the construction 
of 1-70 in the area of the Defendants-Respondents' property. The 
foregoing only applies to situations of eminent domain and not 
voluntary advance acquisitions. 
The problems raised immediately above were exacerbated 
in 1981 when the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-34-19 (1987) which states as follows; 
78-34-19. Action to set aside condemnation for failure 
to commence or complete construction within reasonable 
time. 
(1) In an action to condemn property, if the 
court makes a finding of what is a reasonable time 
for commencement of construction and use of all the 
property sought to be condemned and the construc-
tion and use is not accomplished within the time 
specified, the condemnee may file an action against 
the condemnor to set aside the condemnation of the 
entire parcel or any portion thereof upon which 
construction and use was to have taken place. 
(2) In such action, if the court finds that the 
condemnor, without reasonable justification, did not 
commence or complete construction and use within the 
time specified, it shall enter judgment fixing the 
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amount the condemnor has paid the condemnee, as a 
result of condemnation and all amounts due the 
condemnee as damages sustained by reason of condemna-
tion , including damages resulting from partial com-
pletion of the contemplated use, plus all reasonable 
and necessary expenses actually incurred by the 
condemnee including attorney fees. 
(3) If amounts due the condemnee under Subsection 
(2) of this section exceed amounts paid by the condem-
nor , or these amounts are equal, judgment shall be 
entered in favor of the condemnee, which judgment 
shall described the property condemned and award 
judgment for any amounts due condemnee. A copy of the 
judgment shall be filed in the office of the county 
recorder of the county, and thereupon the property 
described therein shall vest in the condemnee. 
(4) If amounts paid by the condemnor under Sub-
section (2) of this section exceed amounts due the 
condemnee, judgment shall be entered describing the 
property condemned and giving the condemnee 60 days 
from the date thereof to pay the difference between 
the amounts to the condemnor. If payment is made, 
the court shall amend the judgment to reflect such 
payment and order the amended judgment filed with 
the office of the county recorder of the county, 
and thereupon the property described therein shall 
vest in the condemnee. If payment is not made, the 
court shall amend the judgment to reflect nonpayment 
and order the amended judgment filed with the county 
recorder of the county. 
Basically, the trial court can set a reasonable date in 
which construction of the contemplated project should commence. 
Also, a rather stiff penalty is imposed on the condemnor for 
failure to comply. 
In the case at bar, if the condemnation were commenced 
before the contemplated project was fully designed and funded, 
the Plaintiff-Appellant UDOT could subject itself to rather stiff 
penalties. The foregoing shows the intent of the legislature to 
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not acquire private property before such time as the condemnor 
can physically use the condemned property. Under the rational of 
the Ramoselli case and Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-19 (1987), 
Plaintiff-Appellant UDOT would have been precluded from acquiring 
by eminent domain the Defendants-Respondents' property in 1977. 
Also, under the rational of the Walton case, the statute of 
limitations has now run on the Defendants-Respondents alleging a 
taking and/or damaging of their property in 1977. 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO STATUTORY 
INTEREST FROM AND AFTER THE GRANTING OF AN ORDER OF 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY. 
The applicable State statute regarding the payment of 
interest in eminent domain cases is found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-9 (1987) which reads as follows: 
. . . The rights of the just compensation 
for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the 
parties entitled thereto, and said compensation shall 
be ascertained and awarded as provided in § 78-34-10 
and established by judgment therein, and the said 
judgment shall include, as part of the just compen-
sation awarded, interest at the rate of 8% per 
annum on the amount finally awarded as the value 
of the property and damages, from the date of 
taking actual possession thereof by the Plaintiff 
or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the 
date of judgment . . . [Emphasis added] 
The Court in the Laygo and Springer cases granted the 
Plaintiff-Appellant an Order of Immediate Occupancy on October 
28, 1987. The two Orders of Occupancy do not contain any 
reservation whatsoever that interest should be computed in any 
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other manner than that described in the statute referred to 
above. 
It is interesting to note that the case of City of So, 
Oqden v, Fujiki, 621 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1980) was cited as authority 
in the case of UDOT v, Friberq, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984). There 
is no mention whatsoever of the Friberq case overruling, 
superseding or modifying in any way the Fujiki case. There is 
absolutely no legal justification for the Defendants-Respondents 
assertion that the Fujiki case is "of questionable validity" 
because of the Friberq case. (Laygo R-65, Springer R-63) The 
only reason for the Defendants-Respondents' statement is that the 
holding in the Fujiki case is directly contrary to the position 
these Defendants-Respondents now want this Court to adopt. In 
the Fujiki case, the City of South Ogden filed its Complaint to 
acquire a portion of the Defendants' property. The City of South 
Ogdenf in its Complaint, referred to their application for an 
Order of Immediate Occupancy, but never applied for an Order from 
the Court. In between the filing of the original Complaint and 
the date Judgment was entered, neither the City nor the 
Defendants occupied the property sought to be condemned. The 
Utah Supreme Court held that the City did not occupy the property 
in question and therefore interest should only run from the date 
the final Judgment was entered. 
The Friberq case cited as authority on Page 835 and 
followed the holding of the Fujiki case and only allowed the 
Fribergs' interest on the award from the date of the Fribergs' 
abandonment of the property. The obvious rational being that as 
long as the Fribergs were occupying their home, which was located 
on the property sought to be condemned, that UDOT could not 
occupy the Defendants' property and therefore would not be 
obligated to pay interest. 
Similar issues raised by the Laygo and Springer 
Defendants-Respondents were considered and decided in the case of 
State v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953). In the Peek 
case, the Defendants argued the service of summons effectively 
interfered with the use of their property and therefore was an 
unconstitutional taking without the payment of just compensation. 
That service of summons practically eliminated any possibility 
for the sale of their property. The Utah Supreme Court held the 
Defendants in the Peek case were not entitled to interest on the 
Judgment prior to the time actual possession was taken. There is 
more of a taking involved with the service of summons than with a 
corridor announcement because no improvements put on the property 
thereafter will be paid for. As noted above, the Utah Supreme 
Court only allowed interest from the date of actual possession by 
the condemnor. 
The case of State v. Bettilyon, 17 Utah 2d 135, 405 
P.2d 420 (1965) dealt with the issue of what constitutes a 
"taking of actual possession" of property. In the Bettilyon case 
the landowners applied to Salt Lake County for approval of a 
subdivision, but upon the request of UDOT the County deferred the 
approval of the subdivision because UDOT expected to use some of 
the proposed subdivision property for highway construction. The 
Utah Supreme Court held this did not constitute a taking and 
condemnees were not entitled to recover expenses incurred 
thereafter or interest from the date of deferment. The facts in 
the Bettilyon case are much stronger in that neither the Laygo 
nor Springer Respondents-Defendants ever applied for any proposed 
development of their property, including a portion of the Laygo 
property which was separated by a road from any proposal for the 
interstate. The Springer property had a highest and best use of 
horse belt either with or without the freeway, either in 1977 or 
1987, due to the high costs in either scenario of bringing urban 
services to the property. (Tr. 411) The Laygo property could 
have only a limited portion taken in 1977 or 1987 due to the 
location of a nearby spring and pump house that was to be 
preserved and, in any event, the property owners withdrew their 
effort with UDOT to delineate the approximate location of the 
proposed relocation of the canal that would result from the 
interstate project. (Tr. 432-438) Consequently, there is no 
taking by UDOT of the Defendants-Respondents Laygo and Springer 
properties so as to cause interest to run. 
A case from the State of Nevada supports the conclusion 
that there was insufficient governmental intrusion in the 
Springer and Laygo cases to support Defendants-Respondents 
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claims. (Of course, if there was such a claim available then, 
the statute of limitations and governmental immunity statutes 
would have barred such a claim now, as discussed previously in 
this brief). In Sproul Homes of Nevada v. State Ex. Rel. Dept. 
of Highways and County of Clark, 611 P.2d 620 (1980), the Nevada 
Supreme Court held that certain precondemnation activities did 
not give rise to an inverse condemnation action, which is really 
the essence of Defendants' claim herein desiring an earlier 
valuation date. In Sproul Homesf the complaint alleged that the 
State indicated a need to construct a portion of U.S. 95 
Expressway, that the State discussed with the landowners the 
intention of the State to acquire a large portion of their land, 
that the State entered the land for purposes of a survey and 
appraisal, and that the landowners could not obtain building 
permits to construct improvements on the subject property. In 
fact, the Clark County Board of Commissioners approved a zone 
change on the subject land with the condition "'that no 
development will take place on the triangular portion of property 
bound by the proposed freeway...'••. Sproul Homes, supra at 621. 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that the mere planning 
of the project, studying and surveying the land in light of no 
showing of a physical invasion of the land or finality of the 
acquisition of the subject property by the State, did not give 
rise to an inverse condemnation claim. The Court found that the 
State had placed no legal or physical obstacles on the 
development of the property and therefore no "precondemnation" 
had occurred. 
The facts in the Sproul Homes case were actually much 
closer to establish governmental intrusion that the case at hand. 
Nevertheless, the Sproul Homes case and the case at hand both 
involve situations where the project had not been finalized at 
the time the landowners claim a condemnation occurred. To the 
extent there was any precondemnation obstruction of development 
in the proposed highway corridor, it was the result of actions by 
the City of Richfield and not the State. (Laygo R-91, Springer 
R-89) Nevertheless, there is no evidence in the record that the 
City of Richfield denied any development on the subject 
properties. 
POINT IV 
THE VALUATION DATE IS CONSIDERED A DEFENSE TO A 
CONDEMNATION ACTION AND IS ABANDONED WHEN THE 
DEFENDANT LANDOWNER WITHDRAWS THE PLAINTIFF'S 
DEPOSIT. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987) deals with the issue 
of when a Defendant landowner abandons their defenses to a 
condemnation action. The pertinent part of the statute reads as 
follows: 
Upon the application of the parties in interest, 
the court shall order the money deposited in the 
court be paid forthwith for or on account of the 
just compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. 
A payment to a Defendant as aforesaid shall be 
held to be an abandonment by such Defendant of all 
defenses excepting his claim for greater compensa-
tion. [Emphasis added] 
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As noted above, the Plaintiff tendered into Court the 
full amounts of its approved appraisals and the deposited funds 
were shortly thereafter withdrawn by each of the Defendant-
Respondents. The Defendants-Respondents by their withdrawal 
abandon all "defenses" to the Plaintiff-Appellant's action in 
eminent domain, except their claims for greater compensation. 
The statute seems to differentiate between "defenses" 
and claims for greater compensation. The argument which the 
Defendants-Respondents raise in their memo that "valuation date" 
and "greater compensation" are synonymous is totally absurd and 
without legal recognition. (Laygo R-68, Springer R-66) 
Justice Oaks in his concurring opinion in the case of 
UDOT v. Friberg, 687 P.2d at 836 stated the following: 
While I share the dissent's view that the best 
interests of all concerned dictate that the State's 
right to take by eminent domain be resolved as soon 
as possible, property owners who do not abandon their 
defenses in the manner specified in § 78-34-9 (with-
draw the Plaintiffs' deposit) must have an opportunity 
to litigate them. Either party can bring that issue 
on for decision, with or without a simultaneous deter-
mination of "damages" (compensation). Because that 
was not done in the case (withdrawal of the Plaintiffs' 
deposit) the effect was to postpone the date for the 
determination of value (compensation), as explained 
below. (Explanation in parenthesis added by this 
writer.) 
Justice Oaks goes on his opinion and equates the 
"State's right to condemn" and "date of valuation" as defenses 
which are waived and conceded by the Defendant landowners when 
an Order of Immediate Occupancy is granted and the Defendant 
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landowners withdraw from the Court the condemnors' deposit. 
The foregoing is also adhered to in the case of 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296 
(Utah 1987). The Tanner case cites the UDOT v. Friberg case as 
follows: 
The parties entered into a stipulation 
that was incorporated into an order establishing 
the State's right to condemn and reserving for 
later determination the amount of compensation to 
be awarded and the date for assessing valuation. 
Tanner, 740 P.2d at 1300. 
The Court in the Tanner case held that once a property 
owner chooses to withdraw the money deposited by the State in 
obtaining the Order, he waives all objections and defenses to the 
action and to the taking of his property, except any claim to 
greater compensation. The Court went on to hold that by the 
Defendants-Respondents withdrawing the monies, the Plaintiff-
Appellant acknowledged that the condemnor had met all of the 
jurisdictional requirements. 
In the present case, to allow the Defendants-
Respondents to now contest the valuation date would be to 
sanction abuse. To allow the Defendants-Respondents to depart 
from the rule set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 (1987) is to 
invite controversy in every condemnation case and afford a means 
for parties to manipulate the measure of compensation, which the 
statutory provisions attempt to prevent. If the Defendants-
Respondents wished to have contested the valuation date, they 
should have raised it in their response to the Complaint and 
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should have not withdrawn the immediate occupancy deposit. 
POINT V 
THE DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' EXPERT WITNESSf MR. 
KAY McIFF (WHO WAS THEIR PRIOR ATTORNEY) ERRED 
WHEN TESTIFYING CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE SPRINGER PROPERTY BECAUSE HE RELIED 
UPON IT BEING ASSEMBLED WITH ADJOINING PROPERTIES. 
Mr. Mclff's testimony relative to the highest and best 
use and development of the Springer property in 1977 was 
predicated on it being assembled into a roughly 20 acre tract 
total. (Tr. 499) 
"A. Assemblage is kind of the reverse of subdivision. 
It's appraising a parcel of property in conjunction with other 
properties with which it may be joined for a common utilization. 
Q. Talking about consolidation? 
A. Consolidation. And you employ it where that kind 
of consolidation or assemblage would be mutually advantageous and 
help realize the highest and best use out of that property. 
Q. Is assemblage a common phenomenon in the 
development of real property where there is no unity of title as 
Mr. Ward correctly observed? Is it a common phenomenon? Is it a 
thing that is commonly done in marketing properties for 
residential purposes? Have you done it? 
A. Yes. And I think it's essential to do in some 
instances to realize the highest and best use of property. It's 
frequently done in putting together packages for commercial 
constructionf or for residential construction as in my 
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experience. 
Q. And isn't it just as simple as going to the 
individuals who own the served or segregated title and showing 
them the economics of an assemblage and establishing, I mean 
showing them in their minds that it's the best of use that they 
can put to are their property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that relates to the highest and best use, does 
it not? 
A. It does. 
Q. Did you make an investigation concerning assemblage 
of the Springer, the Lind property, with other properties? 
A. I did. 
Q. What investigation did you make? 
A. May I step down, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
[WITNESS RESPONDED] 
WITNESS: A. I previously testified that the Lind 
and Springer properties— 
[INDICATED] 
—were part of a roughly 20-acre tract, located west of what is 
now Plat-J and that that tract, as a whole, was suitable for 
residential development. The ownerships, in my investigation, 
revealed the ownership by Lind, and then between Lind and 
Springer by Krofts. Mr. Lind already testified that he had an 
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agreement with Krofts to join together in an effort to— 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, I would object to that. I 
don't remember hearing that at all. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Yeah. He did. He said that. 
MR. WARD: Well, let's see the agreement, then. 
Let's see the agreement. The best evidence would be the agree-
ment itself, Your Honor. Let's see it. 
THE COURT: I really don't remember it. Do you 
have an agreement? 
WITNESS: A. No, Your Honor. His testimony in 
conjunction with the EXHIBIT NO. 36, the plat, that it contem-
plated a joint development with the Krofts. 
MR. WARD: Your Honor, that was drawn merely to 
show how property might be developed. There's no agreement 
attached to that. 
THE COURT: Well, the objection is sustained. I 
don't remember that. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Well, it's either in the record 
or it isn't. 
THE COURT: As I remember that, that was how he 
would get down to his property. That's how I remember it. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I'm sorry. You're right, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: Q. What other investigation did 
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you make concerning the principal of assemblage? 
A. Mr. Lind's property. Then there was the Krofts 
property, and at least my investigation and on which I premised 
my opinion was that Krofts were agreeable to the assemblage 
concept. 
MR. WARD: Objection, Your Honor. How could he 
tell what Krofts may or may not be willing to do, Your Honor? 
It's hearsay. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I think it falls into the same 
category as— 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think he can, either. I 
grant that. But I think what he's trying to do is say there's a 
possibility of development in a particular way that could have 
taken place, and I believe that's all you're getting to." 
[Emphasis added] 
The foregoing opinions were contrary to law, 
speculative and totally without foundation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has spoken directly to the issue 
of projected use as it relates to the value of property in a 
condemnation action. The court stated that the projected use 
must be more than possible, it must be reasonably probable and go 
beyond the realm of mere speculation of what might happen 
sometime in the unknown future. State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167, 
397 P.2d 463 (1964). 
Even though the Jacobs court found that the admission 
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of this sort of evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge, the judge in this case allowed the opinion to come 
in without any sort of support or foundation, clearly in 
opposition to the directives of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has given 
its direction on the precise issue of this case. In Olson v. 
United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934) the Court affirmed the 
admissibility of evidence on the possibility of combining the 
condemned parcel with other properties for the highest and best 
use. The Court then stated that if such a combination of 
properties is not a reasonably probable occurrence, the evidence 
should be excluded as "mere speculation and conjecture", because 
courts do not use such things in their search for truth. 292 
U.S. at 257. See also, United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 
319 U.S. 266 (1942), (affirming the idea that there must be a 
reasonable probability of the land combination or else the mere 
possibility is too remote and speculative.), United States v. 
70.39 Acres of Land, etc., 164 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.Cal. 1958), (the 
opinion of an expert will not be heard on the issue of how 
probable the combination is; facts are necessary for that 
determination). 
In the present case, The only way that the Springer 
property could ever be used for the development of a subdivision 
would be to combine that one acre parcel with the surrounding 19 
acres, which Springer does not own. Mr. Mclff presented no facts 
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or agreements to support the possibility of the combinations of 
the lands in question• In fact, he admitted to the court that he 
did not have an agreement for the combination of lands. (Tr. 
502) His entire testimony, therefore, was based on his opinion 
as to what might happen sometime in the undetermined future. 
Courts have, as a rule, excluded such testimony as speculative, 
and the trial judge in this case erred in allowing it to come in. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendants-Respondents' argument is fraught with 
legal inconsistencies. There is no legal comparison between the 
cases at bar and the Friberg case. In the Friberg case, a 
Complaint was filed, and because of the long delay which occurred 
before the case came to trial, and the substantial increase in 
land values during this seven year delay, and the fact that the 
Defendants reserved their right to challenge the State's right to 
condemn and didn't draw down on the money, the Friberg Defendants 
were given the later trial date. None of the foregoing facts 
exist in the cases at bar. 
The EIS was approved in 1977, but additional approvals 
and funding were required. The actual alignment of the freeway 
had to be designed with respect to each landowner involved. The 
final design would not have been available until shortly before 
December, 1985. Also, funding would have to occur which did not 
take place until December, 1985. If UDOT is required to purchase 
the necessary property as soon as the alignment corridor is 
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known, this creates an impossibility for UDOT. The design with 
respect to each individual landowner is not known until there is 
a final design. Also, if UDOT doesn't have the necessary fund-
ing, it cannot commence construction as required by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-19 (1987). 
If these Defendants-Respondents succeed, it will mean 
that every time a condemnation is filed, there will have to be a 
second trial to determine the date of valuation. The Defendants-
Respondents being able to choose the date of valuation as any 
time the land values were the highest between when the corridor 
is announced and when the case comes to trial. 
That if the Defendants-Respondents' property was taken 
and/or damaged in 1977, this created a cause of action which the 
statute of limitations has run and the Governmental Immunity Act 
was not complied with. 
The Defendants-Respondents are only entitled to 
statutory interest from and after the date this Court granted an 
order of occupancy. The cases cited do not allow interest to run 
from the date of valuation. There is no evidence that either the 
Springer or Laygo property owners sought building permits. The 
Springer property had the same highest and best use with or 
without the interstate project. The Laygo property owners did 
not even pursue developing the portion of their property that was 
not being considered by UDOT for the interstate project. 
None of the Defendants-Respondents have raised in any 
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pleading filed with this Court and/or the pretrial held in this 
case any issue relating to a different valuation date or the date 
when the statutory interest should commence to run. It would be 
extremely unjust and "unfair" to require a 1977 date of 
valuation. There is absolutely no statutory basis to require the 
Plaintiff to pay statutory interest from the date of valuation. 
Finally, the Defendants-Respondents have failed to show 
that land values were substantially higher in 1977 than in 1986-
87. In factf the land values were actually higher in 1982-83 
than in 1977. The most the Defendants-Respondents have shown is 
that in 1977 there was a greater demand for lots in the Richfield 
area and therefore, the lot absorption rate would have been 
greater. 
Based upon the foregoing, the dates of valuation in 
these cases should be the service of summons and interest should 
commence to run only from and after the dates the Court granted 
the Plaintiff-Appellant's Orders of Immediate Occupancy. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1989. 
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